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NATIONALIST WEEK
No.4
16th June 2004
"All the lands you see before you shall be yours - if you will only bow
down and worship me"
...and too may Nationalists are worshipping at the foot of Mammon! It
was true in a biblical sense and it is true today - when ZOG offers
easy victories then just say NO!
To quote Rockwell on this subject:-
"Real victories are only won by sacrifice - the path to power leads
through the dungeons"
This issue is given over to John Tyndall's election analysis so just a
couple of items:-
1. A BIG meeting in Bradford on July 11th (Sunday afternoon ) sponsored
by the "Nationalist Alliance". All genuine White Nationalists welcome.
Phone Andy King on:-
07817927455 for more details...
Speakers so far:-
John Tyndall
Tony Braithwaite
Eddy Morrison
Chairman - Stuart Collins
more to be confirmed...
<mailto:spearheadsupportgroup@yahoogroups.com>
IMPORTANT - this is a NON PARTY rally so all from whichever group are
welcome. We want to see SOLIDARITY on July 11th - a meeting to move us
forward!
2. Why not join the SSG Forum? Just e-mail
spearheadsupportgroup@yahoogroups.com
<mailto:spearheadsupportgroup@yahoogroups.com>
WRONG PRIORITIES – WRONG RESULTS
by JOHN TYNDALL
This is an advance copy of an election analysis due to appear in the
July issue of Spearhead.
FIVE YEARS AGO, just after the Euro Elections of 1999 and while I was
still chairman of the British National Party, I convened a conference
of top party officials to discuss the outcome of those elections and
the lessons they had provided for us. High on the agenda of this
conference was the proposition that fighting for seats in Europe,
though it had brought us some very welcome spin-offs in publicity and
recruitment, had not repaid the huge investment the party had made in
money and effort, and that we should seriously consider abandoning Euro
Elections for the foreseeable future.
For myself, I was about 95 per cent convinced in this view; but I
wanted to hear the opinions of others before incorporating it firmly
into party policy. From the very beginning, I had not been among the
most ardent enthusiasts in the party for contesting Euro Elections; but
I had been persuaded by others that we should give it a try. Both
principle and expediency had governed my thinking on this. In
principle, the BNP should decline to recognise the legitimacy of the
European Parliament, which it might have appeared to do by taking part
in European Elections. Against this was the view that by contesting
elections to it, provided we did so on sufficient a scale, we could
obtain the benefits of TV time and the postal distribution of vast
numbers of election leaflets that would get across our policy for
quitting the EU and serve as an excellent means of recruitment. It was
a view that merited strong consideration.
But this view – the expedient view – seemed strongly balanced by an
alternative view, also based on expediency. This was that the sections
of the British public accustomed to support the BNP on issues like
immigration would not necessarily do so on Europe – even if, as was far
from certain, they were sufficiently motivated by the European issue
even to bother to vote at all.
The UKIP factor
Added to this was the fact that in the Euro political arena we would be
opposed by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which would
probably appeal to a wider section of the Euro-Sceptic voters than we
could. In other words, in contesting Euro Elections we would be
fighting at a decided disadvantage in relation to UKIP. In elections
where immigration was a major issue, we would be fighting on a
battleground favourable to us; in those where the main issue was
Europe, we would be fighting on ground favourable to UKIP. So it
transpired in the 1999 Euro Elections, in which UKIP won three seats
and the BNP none.
I approved the decision to contest the Euro Elections in 1999 because
it was something that had not been tried, and had it never been tried
there would forever have lingered in the party the feeling that we had
forfeited an opportunity from which we might have derived massive
benefit.
But in the outcome I came to believe that the benefit, though not to be
derided, did not justify the mammoth effort we had put into those
elections. I put this matter up for debate in the party, and waited to
receive some feedback. But then events overtook us; I was replaced as
party leader and my part in the debate (if there was any) was at an end.
I changed my opinions on Euro Elections very slightly as a result of
the great successes the BNP enjoyed in the North West of England in the
general election of 2001 and the local government elections in 2002 and
2003. Because of these, I felt that we should contest the Euro seats in
that region and maybe two others, as there seemed the possibility of a
return that could send one BNP candidate to the Euro Parliament.
However, I never entertained the wildly optimistic expectations of such
a success that were expressed in official party publications, which
projected onto the North West Region as a whole the excellent votes we
had received in just a small number of areas there. This very cautious
viewpoint of mine was discussed privately with some close friends and
associates in the party, and there was general agreement on it between
us, some of them not even entertaining my hope that we might get one
candidate elected in the North West. We did not bring this viewpoint to
general notice within the party, as it would no doubt have invited the
accusation that we were putting a damper on things and undermining
members’ morale and resolve! We quietly kept our own counsel and waited
to see whom events would prove to be right.
One factor which contributed to our caution was the certainty that UKIP
would be contesting the Euro Elections everywhere, including the North
West of England, and that that party would make considerable inroads
into our support. At that time we did not anticipate the tremendous
surge that UKIP would make in the last weeks of the Euro Election
campaign, with a huge publicity drive backed by financial resources way
out of our league, with big mass media coverage and with several
popular celebrities jumping on board. This clearly was not foreseen
either by the present BNP leadership, and we do not hold them to blame
for this.
But what the leadership should have foreseen from the very beginning –
based on our 1999 experience – was that Euro Elections did not provide
favourable ground for a massive commitment of money and effort to them
by the BNP, particularly with UKIP as rivals in the field, as it was
always certain would happen.
Local government elections should have had priority
Where the favourable ground did undoubtedly exist was the arena of
elections to local government all over England and Wales. It was on
this ground that the BNP had consistently done well and consistently
performed better than UKIP. There existed huge opportunities for it to
build on this success and win many more seats this year. But it
required that overwhelming priority be given to local government
elections, and a relatively minor commitment to Euro Elections, with
far fewer regions contested.
But instead, the party leadership decided on the very reverse. The
overwhelming priority was given to the Euro Elections, while local
government elections came off second best by a long way.
A hugely ambitious fund-raising campaign was launched to pay for the
fielding of Euro candidates in every region of mainland Britain, and a
great deal of money was raised – due to the magnificent sacrifices of
great numbers of party supporters, who had been persuaded that the
sacrifices were worthwhile. Had even half of this money been devoted to
enabling the party to make a stronger challenge in local government
elections, with a higher volume of literature output, with posters and
many other local election aids, that challenge would have been
immensely strengthened. In the end, the party emerged with no Euro
seats and just four council seat more than it had had previous to these
elections, but in many areas BNP candidates came so close to winning
that that extra money might well have tipped the scales between defeat
and victory.
Out of focus
And is not all. Money aside, the focus of the party’s leadership was so
heavily tipped towards the Euro Elections that, again, local government
elections came off second best. Everywhere, we relied on energy and
initiative to be shown by local leaders, who simply did not receive the
backing and encouragement from the top that they should have done.
Considering this, their efforts were highly praiseworthy. Particular
praise must be given to the efforts made in Bradford, where four
councillors were elected, and in Epping Forest, where three BNP
candidates got in.
Doubtless, party spin-doctors will make a big issue out of the fact
that one of these three was the Jewish candidate, Mrs. Pat Richardson.
However, two other candidates (non-Jewish) were also successful, and it
is fair to say that it was the well-organised local campaign, rather
than the identity of one of the candidates, that was decisive in this
poll.
The party did not, in the end, get the hoped-for councillor on the
Greater London Authority. Here the UKIP intervention was a handicap
(two UKIP candidates were elected). The party leadership was not to
blame for the UKIP factor here, as it was in the case of the Euro
Elections, but it stands to be indicted for putting less effort into
the GLA than it should have done. We know of cases of London activists
being diverted to campaigns outside the Metropolis, when just that bit
more effort there could have tipped the scales between the 4-04 per
cent we received and the five-plus per cent that might have won us one
seat.
One factor that was trotted out as justification for the huge
commitment to the European elections was the massive Euro payroll: the
almost obscene salaries and allowances doled out to MEPs with the
obvious intention of making them compliant and putting their jobs
before their countries. It was proclaimed to the BNP membership that
the party would reap massive benefits from this bounty by way of its
own MEPs making over 40 per cent of their earnings to party funds (an
allocation which would still have left them with incomes only dreamt of
by the vast majority in the party. There have been some in the party
who have maintained that it was this expected financial bonanza, rather
than any rational calculation of political benefits, that shaped the
decision to go flat out for the Euro seats rather than concentrate more
resources on getting councillors elected. This will forever probably
remain a bone of contention in party circles, but at the end of the day
the proof of the pudding must be found in the eating, and those who
determined party strategy in the 2004 elections must be judged by the
results obtained. The big Euro payola did not materialise because the
seats were not won; the rest becomes academic.
Factors in previous success
When the BNP was scoring spectacular electoral successes in 2001, 2002
and 2003 we maintained in this journal that this was due to remarkable
climatic changes in British public opinion, not to various policy and
presentational gimmicks adopted by the party. We added, of course, that
much credit had to go to local organisers and activists in the
successful areas, who had fought intelligent and energetic campaigns.
We must be consistent with this principle and acknowledge that
disappointments in last month’s elections cannot be laid entirely at
the door of the party leadership and blamed on its various gimmicks,
(which I have always maintained have made no difference one way or the
other to electoral performance). This time climatic conditions were
less favourable to the BNP than in the past, and the tremendous
build-up given by the media to UKIP, allied to its lavishly financed
publicity campaign, undoubtedly contributed to this. The BNP will have
also suffered from increased public hatred of the Blair Government –
particularly in connection with Iraq – and a desire to deliver a blow
against it by any means available. These factors most affected our
party in the Euro Elections, but they did have consequences elsewhere
which were outside our control, particularly in London.
Nevertheless, the disastrous decision to throw the preponderant weight
of BNP resources behind the drive to win seats in Europe must still be
accounted the main factor in last month’s frustrated efforts. This
factor, unlike some others, was within the party’s control, and it
failed to get its priorities right. In particular, it failed to
concentrate more effort in those wards where existing council seats
were being defended.
There is an interesting aside to all this. The UKIP leadership, no
doubt under pressure from the party’s grass roots, altered its former
policy of refusing to face the immigration issue and came out with a
watered-down manifesto for controlling the immigrant influx. With
recent trimming of BNP immigration and race policies, together with the
fielding of a Jewish candidate and the inclusion of a Sikh in a BNP
election broadcast, the consequence was very little clear water on this
key national issue between the BNP and UKIP. What it amounted to was
that where immigration was concerned UKIP was permitted to steal most
of the BNP’s clothes. If the public wanted a half-baked policy for
dealing with immigration, shorn of any mention of the racial factor, it
was presented with a much more attractive one in UKIP’s case, backed as
this was by a high-powered and amply financed PR machine rather than
the shoestring budget on which the BNP was forced to operate. This was
unintelligent politics, coming from people who are constantly lecturing
us all on intelligent politics.
The future
We should end this sobering analysis on a note of optimism. The BNP has
not made significant gains in these recent elections due to foolish
strategies, but its overall percentages of the vote have been
impressive. The political landscape is not greatly changed from what it
was when we shook the nation by our successes last year. There is still
a tremendous tide flowing against the globalist establishment and in
favour of nationalism. That establishment has emerged much weaker from
these elections than it was previously. Our opportunities are
correspondingly much greater than they were previously. If there is any
change in the landscape it is a change that favours us in the times to
come.
We should remember another thing from the 1999 results. Although UKIP
got three MEPs elected, it didn’t do them much good in political terms.
Within a year they were convulsed by internal quarrels – as was
predictable in a party with no ideological backbone, lacking in strong
leaders and full of people looking for a political ‘quick fix’.
But we need to learn some very fundamental lessons from our own wasted
opportunities of 2004. There must be a serious debate within the party
over where we are going to go from here, and that debate must not be
stifled by the mini-totalitarians amongst us, who view criticism of
party decisions as tantamount to treason to the party itself.
The activists who have worn out footwear trudging the streets in recent
campaigns, and the donors who have dug deep in their pockets to meet
hugely ambitious financial targets, have a lot of questions to ask.
They are entitled to be listened to, and now is the time for this
process to begin.
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